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particularly at the impact of product market competition on productivity. Using a newly available panel data
on around ten thousand firms in Japanese manufacturing for the years 1994-2000, I show that competition,
as measured by lower level of industrial price-cost margin, enhances productivity growth, controlling for a
broad range of industrial and firm-specific characteristics. Moreover, I suggest that market power, as
measured by either individual firm’s price-cost margin or market share, has negative impact on productivity
level of R&D performing firms. 
Yosuke Okada
Graduate School of Economics
Hitotsubashi University
Naka 2-1, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8601
JAPAN
yookada@econ.hit-u.ac.jp1. Introduction 
Does competition improve productivity? There is some theoretical basis that competition 
enhances productivity, but the empirical basis is not strong enough, especially in Japan
1. There 
is nevertheless the growing prevalence of opinions emphasizing the importance of competition 
in the policy arena such as deregulation, re-regulation, and antitrust. This paper examines the 
determinants of productivity in Japanese manufacturing industries, looking particularly at the 
impact of product market competition on productivity. 
Using a newly available panel data on around ten thousand firms in Japanese 
manufacturing for the years 1994-2000, I provide some additional support for the view that 
competition, as measured by lower level of industrial mark-ups, enhances productivity growth, 
controlling for a broad range of industrial and firm-specific characteristics. Moreover, I suggest 
that market power, as measured by either individual price-cost margin or market share, has 
negative impact on productivity level of R&D performing firms. 
This paper regards price-cost margin as the main competition indicator. There are 
several prior studies which treat price-cost margin as a competition index. Boone (2000) 
provides a convincing argument that any parameter increase that would result in raising the 
relative profit shares of firms would be a suitable measure of product market competition. 
Nickel (1996) defines a competitive measure by average rents normalized on value-added. 
Aghion et al. (2002) uses the Lerner Index which is defined by operating profit minus financial 
cost divided by sales. Furthermore, Nishimura et al. (1999) shows that there is a negative 
correlation between international competitiveness and mark-up. Its sensitivity is uniform within 
an industry though skewness may be problematic in estimation. Overall there is a sound 
theoretical and empirical support for using price cost margin or other forms of rent as the 
measure of product market competition. 
Traditional competition measures such as Herfindahl index and market share are 
misleading in certain business fields, because these measures are crucially dependent on the 
definition of the relevant market and tend to neglect potential as well as international 
competition. Therefore, price-cost margin would be, arguably, a more desirable measure to 
gauge the extent of competition, especially in certain manufacturing industries which are 
confronted with intense international competition. 
At first glance, it seems to be obvious that price-cost margin decreases with 
                                                  
1 There are several prior studies confirming competition effects on the level of productivity, such as 
Geroski (1990, 1995), Caves et al. (1992), Nickel et al. (1992) and Torii (2001). On the other hand, 
Nickel (1996), Geroski et al. (1997), Nickel et al. (1997), Blundell et al. (1995, 1999), and Aghion et al. 
(2002) utilize dynamic panel data models, and suggest that market power reduce the growth of 
productivity and/or innovation. Regrettably there are quite few solid empirical studies concerning 
Japanese industries. 
 2competitive pressure. However, price-cost margin is apparently affected by not only competition 
but also by other various economic conditions, such as demand fluctuation, R&D appropriation, 
and technological opportunity. Accordingly, there are serious endogeneity issues on the 
relationship between price-cost margin and productivity. 
To alleviate endogeneity biases, I utilize a convenient and widely used class of 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators, i.e. the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data 
model (Arellano and Bond, 1991). By using this estimation method, I treat several key 
explanatory variables as endogenous. This estimator optimally exploits all the linear moment 
restrictions that follow from the assumption of no serial correlation in the error terms. This 
method has been widely used in the empirical industrial organization literature (Geroski et al., 
1993, 1997; Nickel, 1996; Nickel et al., 1997; Blundell et al., 1995, 1999; Klette, 1999; Aghion 
et al., 2002).   
I will basically follow the empirical strategy by Nickel (1996). I utilize his 
econometric framework as a basic model in a slightly different specification. Furthermore, I 
expand the basic model with a broad range of industrial and firm specific characteristics. As will 
be discussed in detail in the following sections, I will try to incorporate various market 
conditions as much as possible into empirical formulation to control simultaneity, such as 
demand fluctuation, R&D activity, diversification, financial constraint, and technological 
opportunity. Furthermore, I will examine whether R&D performing and non-performing firms 
may adopt distinct managerial strategies which would result in different productivity dynamics, 
reflecting the Schumpeterian dynamics. 
This paper uses an exceptionally valuable panel data at the firm level. The Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has conducted the comprehensive survey about 
real-world activities of Japanese firms, Basic Survey of Business Structure and Activities 
(BSBSA), since 1991. The BSBSA is one of the “specified” statistics, which means that all 
relevant respondents have legal obligations to respond to them, as is the case in the National 
Census. The BSBSA has been conducted annually by METI since the second survey and I am 
able to examine firm level data consecutively since 1994 to the present. The BSBSA covers all 
the firms with no less than 50 employees and greater than 30 million yen capitalization in 
mining, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade
2. 
The most valuable character of this survey is that it has been conducted by firm-unit of 
observation with a permanent identification code. Establishment data such as Census of 
Manufacturers are also available in many countries, but price setting, investment, diversification 
and R&D activities, to name a few, are rarely determined by the unit of establishment as 
                                                  
2 The survey also covers firms in agriculture, construction, and service sectors, as long as they also 
engage at least partly in one of mining, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade or restaurant activities. 
 3managerial decisions. In this respect, the BSBSA provides valuable information to accomplish 
empirical studies on firms’ competitive behaviors. 
The available dataset consists of an unbalanced panel with a large number of 
cross-section units of manufacturing (more than 13000 firms which are classified by 59 industry 
codes in manufacturing), each observed for a small number of time periods (for the years 
1994-2000 at most). This situation is typical of micro panel data, thereby calls for the estimation 
method that does not require the time dimension to become large in order to obtain consistent 
parameter estimates. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a theoretical background 
concerning the relationship between competition and productivity. Section 3 lays out empirical 
formulation. Section 4 explains variable construction and measurement issues. Section 5 
presents empirical findings. Section 6 discusses some implications and reservations of the 
estimation results. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
There is a broad range of theoretical as well as empirical literatures on the relationship between 
competition and productivity. It is almost impossible to negate that a lot of important 
manufacturing sectors are subject to imperfect competition (Hall, 1988; Bresnahan, 1989). In 
the following, I will review various types of theoretical research which would clarify the 
relationship between competition and productivity
3. 
First, there have been a lot of studies in line with a neoclassical model of firms. If 
firms have market power, their optimum size may differ from minimum cost position, and if 
economies of scale and/or scope exist, such differences may be more noticeable. Furthermore, 
game-theoretic arguments have suggested that the degree to which costs are sunk and the 
resulting intensity of potential competition may be important determinants of market structure 
(Sutton 1991, 1998). Investment, advertising and R&D are typical examples of such strategic 
behaviors that would raise sunk cost, and thereby enhance competitive advantage under certain 
circumstances. 
Second,  contract theory of firms provides various theoretical predictions. The 
relationship between competition and efficiency incentive can be described by using models of 
moral hazard with multiple agents. Holmstrom (1982), Hart (1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), 
                                                  
3 The literature survey hereafter is greatly indebted to Cohen and Levin (1989), Schmalensee (1989), 
Scherer and Ross (1990), Cohen (1995), Nickel (1996), Geroski (1995, 1999), Meyer and Vickers (1997), 
Aghion and Howitt (1998), Bartelsman and Doms (2000), Klette and Griliches (2000), Aghion et al. 
(2001, 2002), and Nishimura et al. (1999, 2003). Obviously the literature review here is not complete and 
I neglected many important applications to a variety of other related topics, such as macroeconomic 
dynamics. 
 4Mookherjee (1984), and Meyer and Mookherjee (1987) present models that demonstrate how 
comparative performance information yielded by competition may enhance efficiency 
incentives. On the other hand, Scharfstein (1988) and Martin (1993) provide models in which 
competition in the product market may raise the sensitivity of profits to manager’s decision. 
They find that increased competition tends to be negatively associated with managerial effort. 
Furthermore, Meyer and Vickers (1997) show that overall welfare effect of comparative 
performance information can either reinforce or weaken efficiency incentives in dynamic 
settings depending on underling information structure. 
Third, endogenous growth theory (hereafter EGT) provides an alternative theoretical 
basis of the relationship between competition and productivity (Grossman and Helpman 1991, 
Aghion and Howitt 1992, Caballero and Jaffe 1993, Jones 1995, Aghion and Howitt 1998, 
Aghion et al. 2001). EGT generates various predictions as to the relationship between 
competition, innovation and productivity. For instance, Aghion et al. (2002) predicts 
theoretically and then examine empirically the relationship between product market competition 
and the number of successful patents. They find an inverted-U relationship between them as in 
line with earlier empirical findings by Scherer (1967) and Levin et al. (1985, 1987). 
Joint consideration of the impact of R&D and competition needs additional care about 
the Schumpeterian dynamics in market structure, since R&D incentive depends not only on 
post-R&D competition, but also on the differences between post- and pre-R&D competition 
(Arrow, 1962). A standard industrial organization theory predicts that R&D should decline with 
competition, as more competition reduces the monopoly rents that reward successful innovators 
(Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). However, a lot of empirical studies show that there is a positive 
correlation between product market competition and innovative output (Geroski 1995; Blundell 
et al. 1995, 1999; Aghion et al. 2002). Competition may increase the incremental profit from 
R&D because it may reduce a firm’s pre-R&D rents by more than it reduces its post-R&D rents. 
Competition thereby encourages R&D investments which may lead to higher productivity 
growth
4. 
Fourth, there are a lot of attempts to identify life cycles of firms. Geroski (1999) 
describes the literature as stage theories of growth (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1993; Ericson 
and Pakes, 1995; Klepper, 1996). Several case studies using relatively long time-series data 
provide appealing empirical findings which are consistent with predictions of the theoretical 
                                                  
4 A recent game theoretic analysis by Vives (2004) shows that increasing the number of firms still tend to 
reduce R&D effort, whereas increasing the degree of product substitutability increase R&D effort 
provided that the total market for varieties does not shrink. This indicates that it is an important role of 
innovation to expand the set of new products, which would change resulting market structure. See also 
Klette and Griliches (2000) which give an alternative explanation to new product innovation by using a 
quality ladder model. 
 5models (Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994, Pakes and Ericson 1998, Klepper and Simon 2000). 
Finally, there is a growing body of the literature concerning Penrosian models of 
organizational capabilities (Penrose 1959, Slater 1980, Nelson 1981, Clark and Fujimoto 1991, 
Teece et al. 1997, Dosi et al. 2000). Penrose thought of firms as bundles of managerial resources 
which were bound together by a set of organizational capabilities. In the spirit of this theory, 
firms compete in constructing organizational capability (or core competence), rather than simply 
setting price or quantity. R&D competition seems to be relevant to this view. Obviously R&D is 
not the only method to build up organizational capability. There are a lot of other aspects of a 
firm’s organizational capability, such as managerial skill, product market strategies, experiences 
(learning by doing or practiced routines), and IT investment. Bresnahan et al. (2002) present 
another line of research in a related vein. 
  The gist which emerged from these growing literatures is that the relationship between 
competition and productivity has a complex dynamics, and that these models of industry 
evolution are mainly driven by differences in productivity within and between firms. Different 
theoretical predictions may be attributable to various assumptions in terms of the source of 
productivity change. Obviously competition is one of the important driving forces, although the 
implication for productivity dynamics varies according to different assumptions on market 
structure and firms’ behavior. 
 
3. Empirical Formulation 
In an excellent study, Nickel (1996) presents evidence that competition, as measured by lower 
levels of rents, is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor productivity (TFP) in 
UK manufacturing. I utilize his econometric framework as a basic model in a slightly different 
specification. Furthermore, I expand the basic model with an additive term of R&D stock using 
the conventional specification of the literature (Griliches 1979, 1986). Both product market 
competition and R&D investment possibly enhances productivity in an intertwined fashion. 
Therefore I treat both of them simultaneously in single empirical specification. That is, I define 
a productivity equation utilizing a Cobb-Douglas production function as follows: 
it j it it it it it t i t i it t comp     s   h   k   c     l     y   y ε ξ ς δ γ α λ α λ λ β β + + + + + − − + − + + + = − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ,  
where   is log of real output,   is log of employment,   is log of capital stock,   is 
log of R&D stock,    is a cyclical component,  reflects the impact of market power on the 
level of productivity,    represents a cross-sectional impact of product market competition 
on productivity growth at the industry level,   is the firm subscript,   is the industry 
subscript,   is the time subscript, 
it y it l it c it k
it h it s
j comp
i j
t i β  is firm fixed effects,  t β  is time effects, and  it ε  is 
serially uncorrelated error terms. 
 6This specification assumes that the production function exhibits constant returns to 
conventional inputs ( , ) and therefore increasing returns to the basic three arguments 
( , , ), following the EGT literature. Note that the present formulation does not make any 
explicit assumption of global profit maximization, reflecting various predictions of firms’ 
behavior in the literature. Put differently, the model allows for the possibility that intangible 
inputs (especially knowledge stock) are not fully adjusted to their equilibrium values, but are 
considered quasi-fixed while the firm solves its short run profit maximization problem. As 
Griliches (1986, p.152) indicated, “while it is likely that major divergences among firms in rate 
of return to R&D would be eliminated or reduced in the long run, the relevant runs can be quite 
long.” 
it l it c
it l it c it k
To eliminate the firm fixed effects, I difference the production function to obtain, after 
rearrangement, 
. ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1 it j it it it it it it it t it it comp     s   h   k   c l c y c y ε ξ ς δ γ α λ λ β ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + − ∆ − + − ∆ + ∆ = − ∆ −
 
To avoid the corruption of parameter estimates,  ,  ,  ,  ,  and some other control 
variables (which are explained in the next section) are treated as endogenous, in that they are 
correlated with 
it y it l it c it k it s
it ε and earlier shocks, but is uncorrelated with  1 + it ε  and subsequent shocks. 
That is, the endogenous variables are treated symmetrically with the dependent variable it y
5. 
Furthermore, after differencing,    is correlated with the equation error 1 , − t i y it ε ∆ . As long as the 
basic error term it ε is serially uncorrelated, however, all lags on ,  ,  ,  and 
beyond  are valid instruments
it y it l it c it k
it s 1 − t
6. 
To alleviate endogeneity issues between competition and productivity, I utilize the 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data model (Arellano and Bond, 1991)
7. This estimator optimally 
exploits all the linear moment restrictions that follow from the assumption of no serial 
correlation in the error terms. That is, I estimate the model using orthogonality assumptions 
between  it ε ∆ and the set of instruments :  is Z
0 ) ( = ∆ is itZ E ε  
                                                  
5 According to the usual terminology of the dynamic panel data analysis,  it  series  is  endogenous if  it  
is correlated with  it  and earlier shocks although  it  is uncorrelated with  1 + it  and subsequent 
shocks. On the other hand, if  it  and  it  is also uncorrelated but still correlated with   and 
earlier shocks, the variable    series are called predetermined. 
x x
ε x ε
x ε 1 , − t i ε
xit
6 As is pointed out by Griliches (1986, p.152), “It is possible to use simultaneous equation techniques to 
estimate such models, but then the argument shifts to the validity of the exogeneity assumption for the 
particular instruments. In the context of my specific data set, it is hard to think of any valid instruments 
except for possibly lagged values of the same variables.” 
7 Baltagi (2001), Wooldridge (2001), Arellano and Honoré (2001), Bond (2002), and Arellano (2003) 
concisely explain recent developments of dynamic panel data models. The description of econometric 
issues in the following heavily depends on these studies. 
 7where  is a vector of instruments dated is Z 2 − ≤t s ) ,..., 4 , 3 ; ,..., 2 , 1 ( T t   N i = = , 
) ,..., , ( 4 3 ′ ∆ ∆ ∆ = ∆ iT i i it ε ε ε ε , and N is the total number of firms. Instrumental variables 
estimators based on this fact is a generalized method of moment estimators (GMM), making use 
of the moment restrictions generated by the serially uncorrelated errors (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). 
  GMM optimally combines the set of orthgonality conditions
8. The asymptotically 





























ε ε  




















′ ∆ ∆ ′ = ∑
N
i
i i i i N Z Z
N
W ε ε  
where  is consistent estimate of the first-differenced residuals obtained from a preliminary 
consistent estimator, and 
∧
∆ i ε
N W2  is a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of  ) ( i i Z ε ∆ ′ . 
This is a two-step GMM estimator. Under homoskedasticity of the it ε disturbances, this structure 
of the first-differenced model implies that an asymptotically equivalent GMM estimator can be 
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where  H is a square matrix with twos on the main diagonal, minus ones on the first 
off-diagonals and zeros otherwise. This method crucially depends on the absence of serial 
correlation in it ε . Absence of serial correlation is partially assisted by the inclusion of dynamics 
in the form of a lagged dependent variable. I use serial correlation tests developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) (hereafter A-B test), as well as a standard instrument validity test (Sargan test). 
  I will mainly report one-step GMM estimators’ results since the standard errors 
associated with the two-step estimators tend to be seriously downward biased, as shown by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). This is because the dependence of the two-step weight matrix on 
estimated parameters makes the usual asymptotic distribution approximations less reliable for 
                                                  
8 I am greatly indebted to Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Honoré (2001) and Bond (2002) as to 
the following econometric description. 
 8the two-step estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
Generally, estimators which eliminate unobserved fixed effects by first-differencing, 
and use lagged values of endogenous variables as instruments, tend to perform poorly in 
situations where the series are close to being random walks. Furthermore, firms’ growth rate 
might be subject to Gibrat’s Law (Sutton, 1997; Goddard et al., 2002). Identification would be 
weak where the series is near unit root process. Blundell and Bond (1998) shows that dynamic 
panel data models obtained after first differencing have large finite sample bias where the 
autoregressive parameters is moderately large and the number of time series observations is 
moderately small. Thus the A-B test statistics and the autoregressive parameters are crucial to 
examine whether estimates are spurious statistical artifacts or not. 
It is worth noting that, in the context to the present model, the attempt to isolate the 
impact of competition on the level of productivity is a search for a time-series effect. It is clear 
from the estimation equation that what is concerned is the impact of changes in the level of 
market power ( ) on changes in productivity. On the other hand, the impact of competition 
on productivity growth is represented by the cross-sectional correlation between industrial 
competition index ( ) and productivity growth. Accordingly, the coefficient of 
competition variables either represents growth effect (cross-section effect) or level effect 




4. Variable Construction and Measurement Issues 
Variable definitions are summarized in Table 1. Complete definitions are available in the 
Appendix. I discuss some variable definitions and their measurement issues here because they 
have important implications for the interpretation of the estimation results. 
 
4.1. Real Output, Real Input of Labor and Capital   
As is suggested by Nickel (1996, p738), freely estimated on the parameters of labor and capital, 
the data tends to push the coefficients strongly toward diminishing returns, which is not unusual 
in a dynamic time-series context. Nickel indicates that this is because of inadequately controlled 
measurement error in labor and capital, strongly accentuated by differencing. Hence for the 
purposes of investigating total factor productivity effects, it is better to impose constant returns
9. 
                                                  
9 By using establishment data, Nakajima et al. (1998) find that, while significant scale economies exist in 
many manufacturing industries, the TFP growth is attributable primarily to technical progress. They 
suggest that the finding validates the current practice of assuming constant returns to scale production 
functions. Klette (1999) shows that there is little scale effect on price-cost margins and productivity using 
establishment data in Norwegian manufacturing. Klette shows that simultaneous estimation of price-cost 
margins, scale economies and productivity reveals statistically significant, but quite small margins 
between price and marginal costs in most manufacturing industries. That is, problems with market power 
and unexploited scale economies seem to be small on average across manufacturing. 
 9The present specification attempts to alleviate the simultaneity bias in the determination of 
employment, capital and output by using lagged variables as instruments. Although the 
coefficients of labor and capital are not the primary concern at the present study, the ultimate 
directions of biases are not known a priori. 
 
4.2. Product Market Competition 
The main indicator of product market competition is constructed by using price-cost margin. I 
utilize individual price-cost margin as a proxy for market power
10. At the same time, I define 










where   indexes firms,   indexes industry, and   is the number of firms in industry i j j N j
11. 
These competitive measures may contain several misspecification biases. The most important 
appears to be: (i) estimates of the competition index would suffer from endogeneity bias; and 
(ii) mark-ups would fluctuate either pro-cyclically or counter-cyclically. 
Concerning the fist issue which is the primary concern of the present study, I treat 
individual firm’s price-cost margin as endogenous, and utilize the firm specific competition 
variable ( ) to measure time-series competitive effect on productivity level. On the other 
hand, the industrial competition measure ( ) is assumed to be exogenous, and their 
identification comes from variation across industries over time. This means that, although 
 is assumed to be time-invariant in the empirical formulation (and this is virtually in 
accordance with the actual data), there still remains some endogeneity bias. To alleviate possible 
endogeneity bias in the industrial competitive measure, I contain several cross-sectional control 




The second point has been examined extensively in the industrial organization 
literature
12. To control market demand fluctuation, I include growth rates of both industrial sales 
                                                  
10 Concerning the calculation of price-cost margin, see Appendix for more detail. 
11 The conventionally used measures are concentration ratio and the Herfindahl index. In exploratory 
works, however, I had no statistically significant impact of these traditional competition measures on 
productivity in various specifications. 
12 Green and Porter (1984) show that markups will be pro-cyclical under imperfect information. On the 
other hand, Rotenberg and Saloner (1986) show markups will be counter-cyclical under perfect 
information by specifying that demand is subject to i.i.d. shocks. Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) and 
Kandori (1991) further show theoretically that counter-cyclicality is robust with serially correlated 
demand shocks for a range of values for the discount factor. These theoretical analyses assume implicit 
collusion among firms. As for empirical findings, Odagiri and Yamashita (1987) and Nishimura et al. 
(1999) find pro-cyclical mark-ups in Japanese manufacturing industries. Domowitz et al. (1986), Machin 
and Van Reenen (1993), Chirinko and Fazzari (1994), and Ghosal (2000) also find similar pro-cyclicality 
in manufacturing industries in UK and US. 
 10( ) and import penetration ( ) in regressions. These 
variables as well as year dummies are expected to control the cyclical components of 
productivity dynamics. 
jt sales industrial _ jt n penetratio import _
 
4.3. Market Share and Diversity Index 
Although market share is conventionally used as an index of market power, there are a lot of 
reservations to use. Nickel (1996, p.733) enumerates the caveats of market share as follows: (i) 
collusion depends not only on the size of the various firms involved relative to the market but 
also on other factors that are hard to control; (ii) potential as well as actual competition 
influences market power; (iii) market share does not fully reflect foreign competitors; and (iv) 
market share uses industrial sales as the denominator, but it is not certain that this represents the 
actual market. Thus, the estimates of market share would have little value as a cross-section 
measure of market power. 
However, if market share is used as a time-series measure, the problems above may be 
less serious. Nickel (1996, pp.733-4) explains the reason as follows. There are two types of 
possible causality: (i) competition to firm growth and productivity growth; and (ii) firm growth 
and productivity growth to competition. Reverse causality yields the opposite sign. Thus if there 
is a positive relationship between productivity growth and competition (or negative relationship 
between market share and productivity growth), the true relationship would be much stronger. 
I use market share ( ) and individual price-cost margin ( it share ∆ it pcm ∆ ) alternatively 
in regressions for the sole purpose of robustness check. Furthermore, in order to alleviate the 
above mentioned issues, I define weighted average market share following Crépon et al. (1998). 
By using their definition, it is also possible to define diversity index of firms. 
To calculate the weighted average market share and the diversity indices, I fully utilize 
individual firm’s sales data by industry in the BSBSA: agriculture, construction, mining, 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and remaining service sectors. The total number of 
industries is 135 in which manufacturing sector consists of 59 industries. Thus the weighted 





4.4. Other Control Variables 
I include additional control variables in regressions as shown in Table 1. Although it is very 
difficult to incorporate a broad range of real-world business activities into a single empirical 
formulation, I attempt to trace not only R&D activity but also some other related aspects of 
industrial and firm characteristics as much as possible. 
                                                  
13 Concerning the variable constructions, see Appendix for more detail. 
 11First, as is specified in the empirical formulation, the effect of R&D stock is measured 
by  γ   that is allowed to vary across firms. Estimation of  γ   may require data on the growth of 
R&D stock. But if investment in R&D does not depreciate, then data on R&D intensity 
( ) can be used to capture the R&D effect it intensity rd _
14. That is,   and  it it it K R k / ≅ ∆
) / ( it it it Y R   k   ρ γ ≅ ∆  where ρ  is the marginal product of R&D, Y  is output, R is R&D 
expenditures, and K  is R&D stock. This implies that the rate of growth in productivity 
depends on the intensity of R&D investment (Griliches 1986). Thus the coefficient of R&D 
intensity can be regarded as the rate of return to R&D
15. 
  Second, in order to control a firm specific appropriability condition which may affect 
individual firm’s productivity, I contain a technology trade variable ( ) in 
regressions. This is defined by technology transaction turnovers (revenue + expenditure) divided 
by sales. This variable is expected to condition appropriability of R&D in a comprehensive 
manner (Levin et al. 1987, Cohen 1995). That is, an active firm in technology transaction is able 
to retain more profit from R&D investment that would induce more R&D expenditures, thus 
such a firm would be more productive. 
it trade tech_
Third, in order to control remaining possible appropriation effect, I define the 
Herfindahl index of R&D expenditures ( ). I include this variable in regressions, since 
I noticed highly distinct distributions of R&D doers as well as the amount of expenditures 
across industries. Larger industries contain more R&D doers and thus tend to have lower values 
of  , nonetheless, some of smaller industries have a lot of R&D performers: some 
industries evenly spread R&D expenditure among firms whereas some other industries 
concentrate R&D on a few large firms. These differences are likely associated with the R&D 
appropriation effect across industries
jt herf rd _
jt herf rd _
16. 
Finally, I contain debt-asset ratio ( ) in regressions as a financial 
constraint variable. The Japanese economy in the latter half of 1990s was suffered from severe 
debt-deflationary pressure. Although this financial predicament would damage the firms with 
it asset debt_
                                                  
14 If R&D investments depreciate, as they likely do, the estimated coefficient may contain some 
downward bias. Griliches and Lichenberg (1984) find that point estimates rise with the assumed rate of 
depreciation but that the specification’s fit is best with zero rate of depreciation. On the other hand, Hall 
and Mairesse (1995) suggest that this sort of method is still problematic because of (i) several 
measurement issues concerning net R&D expenditures, and (ii) possible gestation lag between R&D and 
productivity, and suggest that the relevant coefficients should be interpreted as an ‘excess’ rate of return 
to R&D. 
15 The potential measurement bias on the above-mentioned procedure would be quite serious. 
Nevertheless, it is very likely that there is some R&D effect on productivity. The main purpose of 
incorporating the R&D related variables at the present formulation is controlling the very probable source 
of productivity gain and elucidating the impact of competition on productivity all the more. 
16 This index is accompanied by the similar caveats to the traditional competition measures. The most 
salient point appears to be: (i) international R&D competition; (ii) economies of scale and scope in R&D; 
(iii) gestation lag between R&D investment and productivity gain; and (iv) knowledge spillovers among 
firms. Therefore the coefficients of this variable should be interpreted with the utmost caution. 
 12stricter financial constraint, financial pressure may play some role in motivating organizational 
efficiency and growth, as pointed out by Jensen (1986, 2000), Nickel et al. (1997), and Aghion 
et al. (1999, 2002)
17. 
Note that diversity index, technology trade, and debt-asset ratio are all included in 
levels in regressions. Hence these variables are expected to control the cross-sectional correlates 
of productivity growth. In addition I treat these variables as endogenous variables. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Data Issues 
To eliminate apparent outliers (due to missing data, erroneous data and possible erroneous 
matches) without using arbitrary imputation procedures, I computed the sales/asset ratio and 
eliminated those observations outside the 95 percentile (i.e. 2.5% on both side). I also 
eliminated those observations whose price-cost margins were more than unity. Using these 
procedures, the observations decreased by 5.05%. To make the dynamic panel data model 
estimable, I further eliminated those observations with the number of consecutive periods for 
which data were held was less than five years. By this procedure, the observations decreased by 
27.40%. The industry classification in manufacturing as well as the corresponding number of 
firms in both full sample and estimation sample is shown in Table 2. 
The summary statistics are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Number of observations and 
basic statistics of R&D performers and non-performers are shown in Table 3. According to the 
Student’s t-values, almost all key variables, such as sales growth rate, price-cost margin, 
debt-asset ratio and real value added per employee, are statistically different between R&D 
performers and non-performers. Employment adjustment rate is the sole variable which is not 
statistically different between the two sub-samples. This indicates that R&D performing and 
non-performing firms adopt distinct managerial strategies which may result in different 
productivity dynamics. 
 
5.2. Basic Specification 
The estimation results of the basic specification are presented in Table 5. The dependent 
variable is log of real sales. The number of consecutive periods for which data are held is at 
least five years. Since some observations for market share and price-cost margins are differently 
missing due to erroneous data and possible erroneous matches, the number of observations is 
not necessarily identical with each other. Constant returns to scale in labor and capital are 
imposed in all regressions. All equations are estimated in first differences and include both year 
                                                  
17 Empirical findings by Aghion et al. (2002) suggest that firms with higher financial pressures innovate 
more for any level of product market competition. 
 13dummies and industry dummies. To save space the coefficients of these dummies are omitted. 
  A-B test statistics that average auto-covariance in residuals of order 1 and 2 is zero are 
shown by the rows denoted by m1 and m2 respectively. The pattern of serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals is consistent with the assumption that the  it ε  disturbances are 
serially uncorrelated, so that  it ε ∆ should have significant negative first-order serial correlation 
but no significant second-order serial correlation. There is also some evidence that the AR(1) 
model is well specified for the data series as is shown by the significant coefficients of the 
lagged dependent variable. The estimates, however, are quite small and negative
18. This 
suggests that there may be some very weak tendency to mean reversion which has been pointed 
out by the literature on Gibrat’s Law, although it may result from measurement errors. 
  As the empirical model is over-identified, it is appropriate to use Sargan statistics to 
test the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Consistent with the evidence from the serial 
correlation tests, the null that these moment conditions are invalid is not rejected at any 
conventional significance level in columns (1) and (3). The Sargan statistic from the one-step 
homoskedastic estimator in column (2) marginally rejects the null that the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid. This could be due to heteroskedasticity. However, the two-step Sargan test 
may be better for inference on model specification. Sargan χ
2(98) is 80.51 (p=0.901) in column 
(2) using two-step homoskedastic estimator. In addition, the two-step standard errors tend to be 
biased downward in small samples. For this reason, Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend the 
one-step results for statistical inferences. Thus I report the one-step results in column (2). 
The estimation result in columns (1) through (3) show that the industrial competitive 
measures ( ) are strongly significant and positive. This reveals a significant 
cross-sectional impact of competition on productivity growth, controlling for various firm and 
industry specific characteristics. On the other hand, in columns (2) and (3), the time-series 
measures of product market competition ( or ) have negative sign as expected but 
not statistically significant. These variables are entered in growth rate, thus there are no 
significant impact of competition on productivity level. This non-significance may be partly due 
to small within variation in the data with at most seven-year periods. 
jt comp
it share it pcm
It should be noted that several control variables have also significant coefficients. First, 
cyclical time-series factors such as industrial growth and import penetration are positive and 
significant. Unreported coefficients of either industry dummies or year dummies are also jointly 
significant respectively. Thus it is arguable that industrial demand fluctuation would be well 
                                                  
18 Blundell and Bond (1998) show that if lagged dependent variable has a relatively large coefficient, a 
first differenced estimator such as the Arellano and Bond model may contain significant (mostly upward) 
bias. In this case, they recommend using the system GMM estimator which utilizes additional moment 
restriction of the cross-sectional instruments. Fortunately, this bias is not so serious for the present 
specification, because the autoregressive coefficients are very small. 
 14controlled in the basic specification. Second, debt asset ratio has significantly negative impact 
on productivity. Third, product diversity and technology trade has positive signs although 
statistical significances are quite weak. Finally the coefficients of R&D concentration index 
( ) are negative and significant. This suggests that spreading R&D expenditures 
among firms has positive impact on productivity growth. Although whether the R&D 
concentration index can be regarded as a proxy for R&D competition or knowledge spillovers 
remains to be questionable, it is an interesting finding from the viewpoint of Schumpeterian 
dynamics
jt herf rd _
19. 
 
5.3. R&D and Productivity 
Next, in order to see whether or not R&D affects productivity growth, I expand the basic 
specification by including R&D intensity variable. Table 6 shows that the impact of R&D 
intensity ( ) on productivity growth is positive and highly significant. If R&D 
intensity can be regarded as the rate of return to R&D, substantial part of productivity growth 
can be attributable to R&D stock. The parameter estimates (0.48 to 0.61) are virtually 
comparable to but slightly higher than the estimates of the prior studies in Japan, such as 
Odagiri and Iwata (1986) and Goto and Suzuki (1989). 
it intensity rd _
As for the remaining explanatory variables, I obtain virtually similar results to the 
basic model. The time-series effect of market power ( or ) is negative as expected 
but not significant. The industrial competitive variables are still highly significant. Debt-asset 
ratio is negative and technology trade has positive coefficients and both variables are 
statistically significant. 
it share it pcm
 
5.4. R&D Performers and Non-performers 
In Table 7, I employ regressions by using separate samples of R&D performers and 
non-performers. R&D performers are defined as firms reporting non-zero R&D expenditures 
and non-performers reporting no R&D expenditures within observation periods. In this case, the 
time-series competition effect ( or it share ∆ it pcm ∆ ) has negative signs and is statistically 
significant in R&D performers, whereas they are not statistically significant in non-R&D 
performers. This suggests that market power, as measured by market share or by higher level of 
individual mark-up, has negative impact upon productivity level in R&D performing firms. 
On the other hand, industrial competitive effects are virtually preserved in Table 7. 
Thus it is likely that industrial competitive effects have a robust cross-sectional impact on 
productivity growth. 
                                                  
19 Aghion et al. (2002) found that the equilibrium degree of technological ‘neck-and-neckness’ among 
firms should decrease with product market competition. 
 15Columns (3) and (4) in Table 7 show that R&D intensity has still positive and 
marginally significant effect on productivity level, but the coefficients (0.23 to 0.24) become 
slightly lower than the previous estimates. The possible reason would be an omitted variable 
bias due to the negligence of knowledge spillovers which are more likely to exist among R&D 
performers. Spillovers possibly make the estimated coefficients downward biased
20. R&D 
performers may have better absorptive capacity and could obtain external knowledge more 
effectively than non-R&D-performers, as is suggested by Cohen and Levinthahl (1989). 
Other salient features of the estimated results in Table 7 are as follows. First, the 
coefficients of debt-asset ratio are negative and still highly significant for non-R&D performers, 
but no longer significant for R&D performers. The financial predicament in the 1990s would 
thereby damage more the non-R&D performers than the R&D-performers. I will discuss some 
related issues in the next section. 
Second, concerning the technology trade variable, Table 6 produced positive and 
significant result at the 5% significance level. In Table 7, however, this variable is not 
statistically significant in R&D performers, whereas it is slightly significant in non-R&D 
performers (at 5 to 10% significance level). The possible reasons for this difference between 
R&D performers and non-performers appear to be that: (i) R&D performers may tend to 
appropriate their R&D outcome through in-house production; (ii) some industries with many 
non-R&D performers are likely to be doing relatively more informal R&D, reporting less of it, 
and hence providing the appearance of more productivity gain from technology transaction. 
Thereby the relevant R&D expenditure is measured with error due to less-reporting bias and the 
estimated coefficients for technological trade may be upward biased. Unfortunately this sort of 
bias is hardly avoidable. 
 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Cross-sectional Competition Effect across Industries 
In the previous section, I provided some evidence that product market competition enhanced 
productivity. Now then, it is worth measuring the quantitative size of the competition effect. 
Although our competition measures are defined by the basis of both industrial level ( ) 
and firm level ( ), I will hereafter try to depict the cross-sectional competition 
effect on the industrial basis following Nickel (1996). 
j comp
it it pcm share or   
The impact of competition on productivity growth is represented by the cross-sectional 
correlation between industrial competition index ( ) and productivity growth. In Table 8,  j comp
                                                  
20 The fact that the social returns to R&D exceed its private returns due to knowledge spillovers among 
firms has a sound empirical basis. For example, see Jaffe (1986), Griliches (1992) and Jones and Williams 
(1998). 
 16by using the competition coefficient of column (3) in Table 5 (2.097), I present the ceteris 
paribus industry TFP growth differentials generated by the differences in the average value of 
the competition index across industries. Industry names are placed in the order of productivity 
differentials. 
  These differentials are substantial in magnitude, and are broadly consistent with other 
evidence on the extent of competition in Japanese manufacturing. Less productive industries 
with negative differentials are newspaper, drug & medicines, publishing, toilet preparations & 
others, beverage & tobacco, medical instruments, miscellaneous food products, oil products & 
detergents, industrial inorganic chemicals, and measuring & analytical instruments. On the other 
hand, highly productive industries with positive differentials consist of petroleum refining, 
reeling plants & spinning mills, blast furnace & basic steel, sawmills & millwork, dyed & 
finished textiles, motor vehicles & parts, non-ferrous metals, miscellaneous transport equipment, 
woven & knitted fabrics, and watches, clocks & related parts. 
This simple calculation suggests that the productivity dispersion across industries is 
extremely large. The lowest group contains many highly regulated industries such as 
newspapers, drug & medicines, and medical instruments, whereas the highest group consists of 
industries confronted with fierce domestic as well as international competition, such as reeling 
plants & spinning mills, blast furnace & basic steel, and motor vehicles & parts. 
 
7.2. Time-series Competition Effect 
As was indicated in the previous section, the time-series competition effect presents positive 
impact on productivity only in R&D performers. Under the present formulation, the impact of 
market power (either  or ) is represented by the negative correlation with 
productivity growth. Price-cost margins and market shares are fluctuated within our observation 
periods, and these changes partially explain the time-series variation of the productivity level. 
Hereafter I will measure the long-run competition effect on aggregate basis. 
it share ∆ it pcm ∆
The estimates of proportional change of market share ( it share ∆ ) on productivity 
growth are -0.048 in column (1) and -0.046 in column (3) in Table 7. This means that around 21 
percent increase in market share leads to a 1 percent fall in TFP of R&D performers in the long 
run. Surprisingly, this magnitude is quite similar to the result of Nickel (1996, p.741). According 
to Nickel, 25 percent increase in market share leads to a 1 percent fall in TFP in UK 
manufacturing. It should be noted, however, that the present paper constructed the weighted 
market share reflecting vertical as well as horizontal diversification to some extent. Therefore it 
may not be appropriate to compare these two figures straightforwardly. On the other hand, the 
impact of proportional change of price-cost margin ( it pcm ∆ ) on productivity growth is -0.138 in 
column (2) and -0.146 in column (4) in Table 7. These results suggest that about 7 percent 
 17increase in price-cost margin leads to a 1 percent fall in TFP in the long run. 
 
7.3. Selectivity Bias 
Sample selectivity may be quite serious for a dynamic panel data model. If observations are not 
missing at random, estimates that are based on cleaned sub-samples could be badly biased. For 
example, a negative correlation between estimated productivity shocks and future probabilities 
of exit would induce a negative correlation between an error term and the stock of capital 
among the surviving firms and bias the estimated capital coefficient downward. Moreover, 
sample selection bias due to zero-R&D reporting or less-R&D reporting is hardly avoidable
21. 
The comparison between the full sample and the estimation sample in Table 3 suggests 
that firm size measured by permanent employee or real sales in the estimation sample is slightly 
larger than that in full sample, whereas sales growth rate in estimation sample is relatively lower 
than that in full sample. This indicates that some new growing firms are omitted in our 
estimation sample. In other words, the coefficients of the competition measures would be 
underestimated due to sample selection biases. 
It is difficult to eliminate these selectivity biases completely under the current 
empirical specification
22. By using price-cost margin as an alternative competition measure, 
however, I expect that the above mentioned sampling bias would be, at least partially, alleviated. 
There are no significant differences in price-cost margin between full sample and estimation 
sample as is shown in Table 3
23. Thus it is arguable that price-cost margin would reflect some 
potential as well as international competition. 
 
7.4. Competition and the Japanese Economy in the 1990s 
Finally I make somewhat speculative comments from the viewpoint of policy implications for 
the Japanese economy in the 1990s. There was a lively debate on the causes for the productivity 
decline in the Japanese economy (Motonishi and Yoshikawa, 1999; Hayashi and Prescott, 2002; 
Nishimura et al., 2003; Fukao et al., 2003; Fukao and Kwon, 2004; Caballero et al., 2004; 
Jorgenson and Nomura 2005, among others). Regulatory environment, international competition, 
technological change, malfunction of financial market, IT investment, and evolution of 
industrial mix would be possible factors that altered the nature and direction of productivity 
                                                  
21 Griliches (1994) emphasized this point. 
22 Market turbulence (i.e., entry, exit, and merger) possibly affects productivity dynamics as depicted by 
Baily et al. (1992), Hopenhayn (1993), Olley and Pakes (1996), Foster et al. (1997), Haltiwanger (1997), 
Disney et al. (2003), Nishimura et al. (2003), Fukao et al. (2003), and Fukao and Kwon (2004). 
23 The BSBSA data is truncated by the threshold of 50 employees and 30 million capitalizations. Thus 
new small entrants are not likely to be covered in the survey. Moreover some firms are occasionally 
classified in a different industrial sector from the previously classified one. This inter-industry artifactual 
move would cause possible another sampling bias. 
 18dynamics. 
For instance, Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) indicate that corporate investment is 
the most important factor to explain the long stagnation of Japan during the 1990s. Motonishi 
and Yoshikawa suggest that for large firms, financial constraints are not significant whereas the 
converse is true for small firms. On the other hand, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) show that the 
problem is not a breakdown of the financial system, and suggest that lower productivity growth 
in Japan be ascribable to inefficient supply-side factors, such as aging population and 
diminishing labor input
24. 
The possible reason for the productivity decline in accordance with the findings from 
the present study appear to be: (i) less competitive pressure in certain business fields is one of 
the possible clues to elucidate the causes for inefficient supply-side sectors; and (ii) the financial 
predicament in the 1990s might damage more the non-R&D performers rather than small firms. 
The first issue is the main concern of the present study. There are several prior studies 
confirming that less competitive pressure is one of the possible causes for the productivity 
decline in the 1990s. In a careful study, Nishimura et al. (2003) show that there is no evidence to 
demonstrate natural selection mechanism of economic Darwinism works even in severe 
recession periods in the 1990s. They explore a firm’s entry, survival, and exit and its 
relationship with TFP. Their empirical results show that efficient firms in terms of TFP quit 
while inefficient ones survived in the banking-crisis period of 1996-1997. Fukao and Kwon 
(2004) also provide the similar finding to Nishimura et al. (2003). That is, a large portion of 
aggregate productivity growth was attributable to resource reallocation effect, and such 
metabolism did not work well in the latter half of 1990s. Barriers to new competition would be 
one of the possible clues to clarify the economic slowdown in the 1990s. 
In a related vein, Caballero et al. (2004) explains the Japanese productivity decline by 
the so-called zombie effect. That is, failing companies losing cash-flow were kept alive by 
Japanese banks’ bad loans. This is related to the second point I raised above. As is well known, 
in the latter half of 1990s, the Japanese economy suffered severe debt-deflationary pressure 
which possibly damaged the firms with stricter financial constraint. But it should be noted that 
the zombie firms were not necessarily small firms. 
The present study showed that debt-asset ratio had a negative impact on productivity 
growth of non-R&D performing firms. This financial predicament would thereby damage more 
the non-R&D performers than the R&D-performers
25. R&D-related activities, perhaps, made 
                                                  
24 Hayashi and Prescott (2002, p.227) emphasize that although the so-called “credit crunch” hypothesis 
may be applicable only for the brief period of late 1997 through early 1998, it cannot account for the 
decade-long stagnation in Japan. 
25 The similar results are also obtained by Fukao and Kwon (2004). They show that TFP gap between 75 
and 25 percentile is widening in many industries where R&D intensity is high and internationalization is 
 19firms somewhat resilient to productivity shocks even in the severe recession period. The 
significance of debt-asset ratio is relatively robust with respect to separate samples of large and 
small firms. The estimation results by using separated samples by large and small firms are 
shown in Table 9. The specification fit is rather weak due to serial correlation or invalid 
over-identification, but the coefficients of debt-asset ratio are significant in both samples. Firm 
size may be a red herring because non-R&D performers are not necessarily small firms. This 
finding may be corroborated by Hayashi and Prescott (2002, pp.222-7) showing that despite the 
collapse of bank loans, small firms found ways to finance investment during the recession 
period for 1996-1998. 
  Jorgenson and Nomura (2005) raised another interesting issue concerning productivity 
decline in Japan. According to Jorgenson and Nomura, there was a significant productivity gap 
between IT-producing and IT-using sectors, especially in the latter half of 1990s; Japanese 
IT-using sectors were in miserable situation in the 1990s except for telecommunications 
industry; but IT-producing sectors were exceptionally active, especially in the latter half of 
the1990s. This suggests that IT-using sectors cannot exploit the full potential of IT innovations 
yet. Policy environments surrounding the IT-using sectors in Japan may not be favorable enough 
to innovative use of IT. Generally, IT-using sectors are less competitive because many those 
sectors are tightly regulated. Furthermore, collusive behaviors and bid-riggings are ubiquitous in 
certain business fields in IT-using sectors
26. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Our findings suggest that product market competition enhance productivity growth 
(cross-section effect). Market power has some negative impact upon productivity level in R&D 
performing firms (time-series effect). The empirical findings provided here are subject to a 
number of reservations. Nevertheless, they do raise the issue that suppressing competition may 
turn out to have been very costly to the economy in terms of foregone growth opportunities. 
Hayashi and Prescott (2002, p.228) emphasize that “research effort should be focused 
on determining what policy reform will allow productivity to again grow rapidly”. I agree to 
this remark. It is quite natural to think that well-designed economic policy is a prerequisite for 
productivity growth. Above all things, competition policy would be one of the clues to revive 
the Japanese economy in the 21st century. I hope that the present study may shed some 
                                                                                                                                                  
more advanced. 
26 Japanese antitrust enforcement has slowly but steadily strengthened since the beginning of 1990 with 
the assist of hard pressure from the US government. At the same time there was (and has been) a 
considerable opposition from the Japanese business community against stricter antitrust enforcement. The 
increased movement of strict antitrust enforcement and pro-competitive industrial policy would be an 
important background to understand the Japanese economy since the 1990s. 
 20additional light on the current productivity debate in Japan. 
The present study opens up a number of questions for further study. First, the analysis 
should have controlled for product differentiation because most products in manufacturing 
consist of a number of different level of quality and varieties. However, empirically useful 
measures of product differentiation and appropriate deflators adjusted for quality are difficult to 
derive even in principle, not to mention the practical problems with data availability. 
Second, the cause and effect of productivity change in non-manufacturing sectors is an 
important issue to be explored in future research. The lack of attention to non-manufacturing 
sectors is mainly due to data constraint, but it must be undoubtedly important to enhance 
productivity in non-manufacturing sectors in Japan. Non-manufacturing sectors seem to be less 
competitive than manufacturing sectors due to regulations and enclosed domestic markets. It is 
therefore very likely that there is still a large growth opportunities left in the non-manufacturing 
sectors. 
Third, Griliches (1998) shows that there are substantial heterogeneity and instability in 
the coefficients of the estimated Cobb-Douglas production function. This indicates that a more 
flexible specification of technology would be desirable, as suggested by Klette (1999) and 
Nishimura et al. (1999). The parameter estimates at the present study are still likely to be 
suffered from some instability, especially in the input coefficients of labor and capital. Further, 
dynamic panel data models are in a developing research area and in many cases GMM for panel 
data perform poorly in finite samples. I used a large panel dataset and luckily obtained 
meaningful estimates, although the GMM on first differences may still produce imprecise 
estimates. A new semi-parametric approach dealing with both selectivity and simultaneity in an 
intertwined fashion by Olley and Pakes (1996) would be a promising method in future research. 
Fourth, I construct the R&D related variables by using the firm level data. But firm 
level data may not be adequate enough for the purpose of investigating R&D related activities, 
since some portion of manufacturing firms in Japan are integrated into interlocking groups
27. 
Economies of scope and spillovers in R&D may have also caused another possible estimation 
biases. Furthermore, R&D outsourcing and joint R&D cooperation are more noticeable in the 
late 1990s in Japan. Ownership structure and R&D cooperation, especially in high-tech sectors, 
would be very important issues to be explored in future research. Patent data would be a 
beneficial source of information on these issues (Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002). 
Finally, I must admit that this research adds quite a modest size of knowledge to the 
understanding of competition effect in the Japanese economy. Evidence from the present study 
may not be representative enough because the observation period is just for the years 1994-2000. 
                                                  
27 See Klette (1996) concerning scope economies, interlocking group and R&D performance. 
 21The Japanese economy was in turmoil during the period and many Japanese manufacturing 
firms were in the process of fundamental adjustment of over-capitalization and excess 
employment under serious debt-deflationary pressure. Furthermore, detailed investigation of the 
individual industry and its comparison with industry aggregates is required before any strong 
conclusion could be drawn about the relationship between competition and productivity. 
 
Appendix: Variable Construction 
Real Output, Real Input of Labor and Capital      Output is measured by deflated sales and input 
of labor is defined by the total number of employees. Since there is no accurate information on 
material or the number of hours worked in the dataset, I define value-added as follows: sales - 
operating cost + wage + depreciation + interest payments. Concerning capital stock, making 
consecutive time-series data from BSBSA is virtually impossible, because the BSBSA has 
considerable numbers of samples with null investment as well as the dataset is unbalanced. Thus 
a standard perpetual inventory method is not applicable here. Therefore capital stock is 
represented by the book value of tangible fixed asset deflated by real price of capital goods. 
 
Product Market Competition      I define individual firm’s average price cost margin as follows:   
sales
rK on depreciati  sales of   cost sales pcm − + − =  














× − + =  
where  ρ  is cost of fund (inter-bank prime rate), δ  is economic rate of depreciation 
(assuming  δ =0.09),  is expected rate of inflation of capital goods (approximated by the 
past 3-year moving average of the real price of capital goods, Bank of Japan), 
e
K π
τ is an effective 
corporate tax rate (Cabinet Office),  denotes the present value of the depreciation deduction 
on unit nominal investment, and  is a investment goods deflator (SNA private 
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following Auerbach (1979). 
 
Market Share and Diversity Index     I define weighted average market share following Crépon 
et al. (1998). By using their definition, it is also possible to define diversity index of firms. Let 
 be the sales of firm   for its product   in the industry segment or market   (time 
subscripts are suppressed), then   
k i S , i k k
 22∑ =
k
k i i S S ,  and    ∑ =
i
k i k S S ,
are respectively the overall sales of firm   (over all its products) and the overall sales on 
market   (over all firms). The market share   of firm i  on market   and the share of 
product   in  firm i   total sales are thus equal to:   
i
k k i s , k
k
k k i k i S S s / , , =  and  .   i k i k i S S b / , , =
Note that 
k
 for each firm  . Then for diversified firm i  the weighted average 
market share    and the diversification index ( ) are calculated as follows: 
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, / 1.
For a non-diversified firm, I have   and  i
w
i s s = 1 = i diversity .  
 
Other Control Variables   First, in order to control market demand fluctuation, I include 
growth rates of both industrial sales and import penetration in regressions. Second, I also 
contain a technology trade variable ( ) in regressions which is defined by 
technology trade turnovers (revenue + expenditure) divided by sales. The sum of revenues and 
expenditures of the whole category of technology (patents, utilities, design, copyrights, 
trademarks, and know-how) are used in calculation. Finally, I include the number of R&D doers 
measured by the Herfindahl index of R&D expenditures ( ). I define the measure as 
follows: 
it trade tech_
jt herf rd _
∑∑ =
il
ilt ijt jt R R herf rd
2 ) / ( _ 
where  R  is R&D expenditure,  indexes firms, and indexes industry.  i j
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 32Table 1ɹɹSummary of variables
Variables Definition
 output
Real sales  (1995 yen; deflated by domestic corporate goods price index by industry,
Cabinet Office, 2003ʣ
 emp Number of permanent employees
 capital
Gross fixed asset deflated by capital goods deflator (1995yen using SNA private non-
residential investment deflator, Cabinet Office, 2003)
 industrial_sales
Industrial sales in manufacturing industry (using the whole sample of the BSBSA,
METI, 1995-2001) deflated by the domestic corporate goods price deflator by industry.
 import_penetration
Imports divided by home demand in manufacturing industry (the JIP database
constructed using the Input-Output Table, the Economic and Social Research Institute,
Cabinet Office, 2003). We imputed the 1998 data for the missing 1999 and 2000 data.
 rd_intensity
R&D expenditure divided by value added. We use R&D deflators (JIP database,
Cabinet Office) and wholesale price index (Cabinet Office) as the respective deflators.
 share Weighted average market share (see text)
 pcm Price-cost margin (see text)
 comp 1 - "Industry-averaged price cost margin"  (see text ʣ
 rd_herf Herfindahl index of R&D expenditures in manufacturing industry (see text)
 diversity
Diversification index defined using Herfindahl concentration index of firm sales
in all sectors (see text)
 debt_asset Total debt to total asset ratio
 tech_trade Technology trade turnovers (revenue + expenditure ʣ divided by sales
 size Number of permanent employees
Data sources: The Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (METI, 1995-2001) except some d
penetration index as explained above.Table 2ɹIndustry classification in BSBSA and number of firms (manufacturing industries)
# Industry name
Number of firms
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1 Livestock products 195 124 223 139 204 150 220 154 222 156 232 148 216 135
2 Seafood products 194 114 211 139 205 147 197 144 200 142 202 132 202 126
3 Flour & grain mill products 42 26 47 26 42 26 41 26 45 26 37 24 34 23
4 Miscellaneous food products 791 506 847 571 854 630 858 632 885 632 887 599 858 553
5 Beverages & tobacco 173 126 178 135 177 143 160 136 167 141 169 128 155 117
6 Prepared feed & fertilizers 41 24 43 24 39 28 40 31 39 28 40 27 46 28
7 Reeling plants & spinning mills 61 26 47 26 43 27 48 29 36 28 38 23 32 22
8 Woven & knitted fabrics 142 84 134 83 122 85 122 85 105 84 96 77 78 61
9 Dyed &finished textiles 127 86 120 85 116 92 116 93 111 93 112 90 90 72
10 Other textile mill products 123 73 121 80 118 87 117 88 118 88 105 79 102 76
11 Textile outer garments 399 200 381 205 370 225 340 215 322 218 297 190 253 157
12 Apparel 122 55 144 73 131 70 132 81 108 80 91 70 84 62
13 Sawmills & millwork 146 91 167 105 150 107 161 110 153 105 151 98 139 89
14 Wooden containers & wood 22 10 21 12 21 14 19 12 21 12 15 11 19 13
15 Furniture & fixtures 198 104 193 113 188 123 184 127 184 126 177 114 171 101
16 Pulp & paper mills  151 103 152 113 142 105 133 103 121 103 111 90 116 87
17 Paper products 291 207 299 219 297 248 311 251 317 244 326 237 312 214
18 News paper industries 81 56 80 60 82 64 80 63 92 65 86 63 88 60
19 Publishing industries 99 67 107 69 103 72 107 73 109 72 125 68 125 65
20 Printing 505 369 554 418 553 439 570 450 598 449 588 427 569 393
21 Industrial inorganic chemicals 103 86 117 95 108 96 113 100 113 99 107 91 104 85
22 Industrial organic chemicals 190 147 193 157 203 166 186 158 183 159 194 154 185 138
23 Chemical fibers 22 18 21 18 20 18 18 16 20 16 18 13 17 11
24 Oil products & detergents 145 113 145 114 145 115 138 119 139 116 142 110 139 105
25 Drugs & medicines 201 144 203 156 201 164 193 167 192 167 203 166 197 154
26 Toilet preparations & others 241 176 253 194 265 212 259 209 259 213 271 204 255 186
27 Petroleum refining 31 26 27 23 28 24 26 24 27 24 26 22 22 18
28 Petroleum & coal products 26 14 25 17 25 20 25 19 26 21 26 18 28 20
29 Plastic products 624 442 657 477 660 513 664 517 662 517 685 510 665 471
30 Tires & inner tubes 14 9 12 10 11 10 13 11 11 10 10 10 13 10
31 Rubber & plastic footwear 134 86 134 101 135 103 139 105 133 105 127 95 124 88
32 Leather products & fur skins 50 26 45 22 40 26 38 27 42 27 35 21 38 21
33 Glass & glass products 97 69 99 72 95 73 104 74 96 71 102 67 100 62
34 Cement & cement products 256 154 269 169 252 172 236 175 239 178 228 156 232 141
35 Clay, pottery & stone products 261 153 251 163 258 183 253 179 237 176 217 162 195 142
36 Blast furnace & basic steel 165 127 161 124 176 136 170 138 151 133 165 136 187 140
37 Iron & steel 234 161 264 175 236 181 236 179 236 182 206 157 210 148
38 Non-ferrous metals 51 33 52 40 51 41 51 43 51 42 54 38 54 33
39 Non-ferrous rolling & casting 277 191 290 215 275 218 266 217 280 228 265 206 263 194
40 Fabricated structural metal 347 220 370 237 362 258 357 264 350 268 334 244 313 225
41 Miscellaneous metal work 605 433 650 492 639 522 623 512 661 528 655 501 656 487
42 Metal working machinery 243 158 262 180 256 192 270 194 272 202 235 177 228 161
43 Special industry machinery 361 240 396 282 423 305 392 292 418 301 388 273 419 274
44 Office & household machines 149 106 157 112 157 120 159 122 154 123 157 122 160 117
45 General industrial machinery 717 492 760 561 756 599 798 617 751 590 758 561 744 510
46 Electrical industrial machinery 394 287 421 319 414 332 402 322 381 318 383 294 394 283
47 Household electric appliances 204 123 209 131 195 142 168 123 151 113 146 100 117 81
48 Communication equipment 282 179 286 198 295 218 294 216 287 208 295 196 267 170
49 Electric equipment & computers 185 121 189 119 188 124 186 136 185 130 189 123 191 111
50 Electronic parts & devices 605 416 637 477 666 528 692 533 710 538 702 513 693 465
51 Miscellaneous electric equipment 180 125 213 146 208 152 206 153 207 154 211 145 230 161
52 Motor vehicles & parts 898 659 931 717 927 756 913 750 919 755 913 711 863 670
53 Miscellaneous transport equipment 219 158 213 166 211 170 222 175 237 181 219 163 213 152
54 Medical instruments 70 47 81 57 86 61 84 61 87 62 86 56 84 50
55 Optical instruments & lenses 62 48 56 47 65 55 69 57 70 58 72 54 75 54
56 Watches, clocks & related parts 29 20 33 26 35 26 33 27 31 25 29 18 22 14
57 Measuring & analytical instruments 166 108 178 125 184 131 169 133 163 129 168 126 166 113
58 Ordnance & accessories 9 6 645443444464
59 Miscellaneous manufacturing 288 145 319 176 314 190 267 168 275 175 252 157 247 145
Total 13038 8717 13654 9609 13527 10238 13392 10238 13363 10238 13162 9569 12805 8868
Note: The numbers of firms are given in full sample (left column) and in estimation sample (right column) for every year. The BSBSA covers all the firms
with no less than 50 employees and greater than 30 million yen capitalization.Table 3  R&D performers and non-performers ʢmanufacturing industries, 1994ʙ2000ʣ
All R&D performers Non-performers
Full sample Estimation sample Full sample Estimation sample Full sample Estimation sample
Number of observations (total) 92941 67477 43116 33451 49825 34026
Number of firms (every year) 1994 13038 8717 6320 4564 6718 4153
1995 13654 9609 6453 4894 7201 4715
1996 13527 10238 6229 4991 7298 5247
1997 13392 10238 6112 5000 7280 5238
1998 13363 10238 6076 4961 7287 5277
1999 13162 9569 6091 4702 7071 4867
2000 12805 8868 5835 4339 6970 4529
Full sample (annual average, standard deviations are in parentheses) 
All R&D performers Non-performers Student's t-value p-value
Real sales ʢ1995 million yenʣ 19233.3 (133540.3) 34355.4 (192322.3) 6147.3 (29810.9) -32.29 0.000
Permanent employees 415.3 (1790.0) 677.3 (2555.9) 188.5 (461.6) -41.90 0.000
Sales growth rate
0.52% (16.1%) 0.89% (14.7%) 0.18% (17.2%)
-5.89 0.000
(69867 firms) (33512 firms) (36355 firms)
Employment adjustment rate ʢ%ʣ
-1.33% (12.6%) -1.28% (11.8%) -1.38% (13.4%)
-1.07 0.287
(69867 firms) (33163 firms) (36704 firms)
Price-cost margin 0.19 (0.13) 0.21 (0.13) 0.17 (0.13) -47.49 0.000
Debt-asset ratio 0.73 (0.35) 0.69 (0.25) 0.76 (0.42) 33.18 0.000
Real value added per employee (1995 million yen) 6.85 (4.27) 7.74 (4.58) 6.08 (3.81) -60.38 0.000
Firm age (since establishment year through 1994-2000) 37.75 (14.91) 40.49 (15.07) 35.38 (14.36) -52.87 0.000
Estimation sample (annual average, standard deviations are in parentheses)
All R&D performers Non-performers Student's t-value p-value
Real sales ʢ1995 million yenʣ 23151.5 (155255.6) 39834.9 (216517.1) 6750.0 (34233.3) -27.84 0.000
Permanent employees 480.5 (2061.6) 762.9 (2853.1) 202.9 (520.5) -35.61 0.000
Sales growth rate
0.43% (15.2%) 0.76% 0.10% (16.3%)
-5.20 0.000
(56849 firms) (28403 firms) (28446 firms)
Employment adjustment rate ʢ%ʣ
-1.31% (12.0%) -1.32% (11.2%) -1.3% (12.7%)
0.18 0.857
(56849 firms) (28115 firms) (28734 firms)
Price-cost margin 0.19 (0.13) 0.21 (0.13) 0.16 (0.13) -44.36 0.000
Debt-asset ratio 0.71 (0.26) 0.67 (0.24) 0.74 (0.27) 33.85 0.000
Real value added per employee (1995 million yen) 7.07 (4.26) 7.90 (4.59) 6.24 (3.72) -51.66 0.000
Firm age (since establishment year through 1994-2000) 38.96 (14.59) 41.57 (14.69) 36.39 (14.01) -46.94 0.000Table 4  Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
output 67477 23151.46 155255.60 84.31 9104792
    annual growth rate (%) 56849 0.43 15.24 -169.23 174.65
emp 67477 480.48 2061.62 50 77185
    annual change (%) 56849 -1.31 11.96 -267.22 296.37
capital 67477 7208.69 42868.88 0 1423501
    annual change (%) 56813 2.20 28.13 -616.12 830.90
industrial_sales 420 4434326.43 6325494.38 33284 43112537
    annual change (%) 420 -0.42 13.56 -125.28 76.44
import_penetration 420 0.0847 0.0837 0.0015 0.6085
    annual change (%) 420 4.49 39.57 -380.14 450.15
rd_intensity 67477 0.0390 0.1436 -26.16 5.56
share 64783 0.0032 0.0119 0 0.4179
    annual change (%) 53821 0.28 45.86 -752.55 787.78
pcm 67477 0.1856 0.1287 -0.3632 0.9942
    annual change (%) 55012 0.91 42.35 -775.61 734.67
comp 420 0.8140 0.0607 0.5473 0.9577
rd_herf 420 0.1549 0.1065 0.0213 0.9942
diversity 67477 1.4218 0.6435 1 11.3792
debt_asset 67477 0.7072 0.2593 0 10.0485
tech_trade 67477 0.0008 0.0062 0 0.3435
Notes:
Regressionsare employedin firstdifferencesin terms ofoutput,emp, capital, industrial_sales,import_penetraion,share,
and pcm. The annual growth rate of these variables are also shown in the table. On the other hand, the remaining





Production function: GMM estimates (basic model)
  Dependent variable: ∆output it
ɹɹɹɹ(1) ɹɹɹɹ(2) ɹɹɹɹ(3)
* ∆output it-1   -0.046   -0.035   -0.043
  (0.006, p= 0.000)   (0.007, p= 0.000)   (0.006, p= 0.000)
* ∆emp it   0.327   0.443   0.347
  (0.053, p= 0.000)   (0.062, p= 0.000)   (0.056, p= 0.000)
* ∆capital it   0.719   0.592   0.696
   ∆industrial_sales jt   0.057   0.052   0.059
  (0.016, p= 0.000)   (0.016, p= 0.001)   (0.016, p= 0.000)
   ∆import_penetration jt   0.008   0.009   0.008
  (0.004, p= 0.060)   (0.004, p= 0.028)   (0.004, p= 0.063)
* ∆share it   -0.013
  (0.014, p= 0.352)
* ∆pcm it   -0.016
  (0.015, p= 0.305)
    comp jt   2.450   2.357   2.156
  (0.305, p= 0.000)   (0.292, p= 0.000)   (0.307, p= 0.000)
    rd_herf jt   -0.310   -0.311   -0.289
  (0.049, p= 0.000)   (0.048, p= 0.000)   (0.049, p= 0.000)
*   diversity   0.050   0.037   0.029
  (0.023, p= 0.028)   (0.022, p= 0.099)   (0.022, p= 0.198)
*   debt_asset   -1.063   -1.193   -1.046
  (0.270, p= 0.000)   (0.249, p= 0.000)   (0.248, p= 0.000)
*   tech_trade   2.385   2.540   2.422
  (1.513, p= 0.115)   (1.400, p= 0.070)   (1.446, p= 0.094)
*   size   -1.20e-05   -1.40e-05   -1.65e-05
  (1.52e-05, p=0.420)   (1.41e-05, p=0.322)   (1.47e-05, p=0.264)
   m1   -30.99   (p = 0.000)   -29.29  (p = 0.000)   -27.79  (p = 0.000)
   m2    -0.00 (p = 0.996)    -0.89  (p = 0.376)    -0.74  (p = 0.462)
   Sargan 
  χ
2(98) = 79.31   χ




  (p = 0.625)   (p = 0.085)   (p = 0.331)
   Observation   26121 (10231 firms)   24671 (9683 firms)   25118 (9963 firms)
Notes:  
1) The dependent variable is log of real sales. The number of consecutive periods for which data are held is at least five years.
Some observations for market share (shareit) and price-cost margin (pcmit) are missing differently, therefore the number of
observations using shareit as an independent variable is not identical with that using pcmit. Constant returns constraint is
imposed in all equations. All equations are estimated in first differences and include both year dummies and industry dummies,
although compjt, rd_herfjt, diversityit, debt_assetit, tech_tradeit, and sizeit are all entered in level as control variables. Firm size
is measured by permanent employees.
2) The equations are estimated using the dynamic panel data model based on Arellano and Bond (1991). The GMM estimates
reproted are one-step results. Asymptoticstandard errors and p-values are reported in parentheses. m1 and m2 are Arellano-Bond
tests that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 and 2 are zero, i.e., they are tests for the null on no first-order and
second-order serial correlations, asymptoticallyN(0,1). Sargan statistics are used for testing of over-identifyingrestrictions for the
GMM estimators, asymptotically χ2. P-values are also reported. All computations are done using STATA.
3)  * Variables are treated as endogenous.
4) † indicates that Sargan test from the one-step homoskedastic estimator in column (2) marginally rejects the null that the over-
identifying restrictions are valid. This could be due to heteroskedasticity. However, the two-step Sargan test may be better fro
inference on model specification. The two-step Sargan statistics is χ2(98)=80.51(p=0.901).Table 6
Production function: GMM estimates (R&D and productivity)
  Dependent variable: ∆output it
ɹɹɹɹ(1) ɹɹɹɹ(2) ɹɹɹɹ(3)
* ∆output it-1   -0.044   -0.034   -0.041
  (0.006, p= 0.000)   (0.007, p= 0.000)   (0.006, p= 0.000)
* ∆emp it   0.349   0.459   0.375
  (0.053, p= 0.000)   (0.062, p= 0.000)   (0.055, p= 0.000)
* ∆capital it   0.695   0.575   0.666
   ∆industrial_sales jt   0.058   0.052   0.059
  (0.016, p= 0.000)   (0.016, p= 0.001)   (0.016, p= 0.000)
    ∆import_penetration jt   0.006   0.007   0.005
  (0.004, p= 0.172)   (0.004, p= 0.090)   (0.004, p= 0.195)
*   rd_intensity it   0.576   0.482   0.608
  (0.169, p= 0.001)   (0.144, p= 0.001)   (0.170, p= 0.000)
* ∆share it   -0.010
  (0.014, p= 0.447)
* ∆pcm it   -0.014
  (0.015, p= 0.354)
    comp jt   2.387   2.295   2.097
  (0.302, p= 0.000)   (0.290, p= 0.000)   (0.302, p= 0.000)
    rd_herf jt   -0.306   -0.309   -0.286
  (0.049, p= 0.000)   (0.048, p= 0.000)   (0.048, p= 0.000)
*   diversity it   0.048   0.033   0.027
  (0.023, p= 0.034)   (0.022, p= 0.134)   (0.022, p= 0.216)
*   debt_asset it   -1.035   -1.164   -1.008
  (0.261, p= 0.000)   (0.244, p= 0.000)   (0.239, p= 0.000)
*   tech_trade it   3.141   3.214   2.847
  (1.482, p= 0.034)   (1.378, p= 0.020)   (1.411, p= 0.044)
*   size it   -5.68e-06   -8.57e-06   -9.56e-06
  (1.51e-05, p=0.708)   (1.41e-05, p=0.544)   (1.46e-05, p=0.509)
    m1   -32.18  (p = 0.000)   -30.57  (p = 0.000)   -29.34  (p = 0.000)
    m2    0.06 (p = 0.954)    -0.77  (p = 0.440)    -0.83 (p = 0.407)
    Sargan
  χ
2(98) = 82.20   χ
2(112) = 125.67   χ
2(112) = 109.07
  (p = 0.874)   (p = 0.178)   (p = 0.561)
    Observation   26121 (10231 firms)   24671 (9683 firms)   25118 (9963 firms)
Notes:
1)  See footnotes of Table 5. The GMM estimates reproted are one-step results in all equations.
2)  * Variables are treated as endogenous.Table 7
Production function: GMM estimates (R&D performers and non-performers)
  Dependent variable: ∆output it
R&D performers non-R&D performers
(1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)
* ∆output it-1   -0.024   -0.022   -0.022   -0.019   -0.033   -0.052
  (0.008, p= 0.003)   (0.008, p= 0.004)   (0.008, p= 0.003)   (0.007, p= 0.009)   (0.009, p= 0.000)   (0.008, p= 0.000)
* ∆emp it   0.320   0.377   0.388   0.459   0.641   0.440
  (0.098, p= 0.001)   (0.099, p= 0.000)   (0.090, p= 0.000)   (0.092, p= 0.000)   (0.063, p= 0.000)   (0.055, p= 0.000)
* ∆capital it   0.704   0.645   0.634   0.560   0.392   0.612
   ∆industrial_sales jt   0.056   0.053   0.059   0.057   0.054   0.073
  (0.021, p= 0.007)   (0.020, p= 0.007)   (0.020, p= 0.004)   (0.019, p= 0.003)   (0.024, p= 0.021)   (0.024, p= 0.003)
    ∆import_penetration jt   0.011   0.007   0.008   0.004   0.008   0.008
  (0.007, p= 0.107)   (0.007, p= 0.270)   (0.007, p= 0.241)   (0.006, p= 0.495)   (0.005, p= 0.138)   (0.005, p= 0.139)
*   rd_intensity it   0.242   0.232
  (0.115, p= 0.036)   (0.120, p= 0.053)
* ∆share it   -0.048   -0.046   -0.009
  (0.020, p= 0.015)   (0.019, p= 0.015)   (0.018, p= 0.618)
*  ∆pcm it   -0.138   -0.146   0.013
  (0.028, p= 0.000)   (0.026, p= 0.000)   (0.018, p= 0.445)
    comp jt   2.264   1.742   2.294   1.771   2.356   2.410
  (0.405, p= 0.000)   (0.403, p= 0.000)   (0.387, p= 0.000)   (0.387, p= 0.000)   (0.413, p= 0.000)   (0.448, p= 0.000)
    rd_herf jt   -0.396   -0.345   -0.392   -0.336   -0.231   -0.227
  (0.075, p= 0.000)   (0.074, p= 0.000)   (0.072, p= 0.000)   (0.071, p= 0.000)   (0.062, p= 0.000)   (0.064, p= 0.000)
*   diversity it   -0.001   -0.016   -0.012   -0.025   0.065   0.048
  (0.031, p= 0.987)   (0.031, p= 0.614)   (0.030, p= 0.691)   (0.030, p= 0.396)   (0.030, p= 0.032)   (0.031, p= 0.114)
*   debt_asset it   -0.357   -0.210   -0.359   -0.222   -1.483   -1.250
  (0.208, p= 0.086)   (0.207, p= 0.311)   (0.199, p= 0.072)   (0.197, p= 0.261)   (0.405, p= 0.000)   (0.324, p= 0.000)
*   tech_trade it   3.294   2.518   3.315   2.558   2.501   2.237
  (2.115, p= 0.119)   (2.092, p= 0.229)   (2.042, p= 0.104)   (2.022, p= 0.206)   (1.172, p= 0.033)   (1.253, p= 0.074)
*   size it   -4.09e-06   0.63e-06   -1.78e-06   3.11e-06   6.02e-04   4.86e-04
  (1.36e-05, p=0.764)   (1.36e-05, p=0.963)   (1.31e-05, p=0.892)   (1.30e-05, p=0.811)   (3.92e-04, p=0.124)   (4.32e-04, p=0.261)
    m1   -17.19  (p = 0.000)   -18.39  (p = 0.000)   -19.50  (p = 0.000)   -20.96  (p = 0.000)   -30.56  (p = 0.000)   -24.84   (p = 0.000)
    m2    -0.56  (p = 0.573)    -1.75 (p = 0.080)    -0.61 (p = 0.543)    -2.06 (p = 0.039)    -0.26  (p = 0.794)    0.57 (p = 0.570)
    Sargan
  χ
2(98) = 87.24   χ
2(98) = 77.55   χ
2(112) = 106.87   χ
2(112) = 91.08   χ
2(98) = 74.57   χ
2(98) = 87.20
  (p = 0.774)   (p = 0.937)   (p = 0.619)   (p = 0.927)   (p = 0.963)   (p = 0.774)
    Observation   12868 (5453 firms)   12868 (5489 firms)   12868 (5453 firms)   12868 (5489 firms)   11803 (5377 firms)   12250 (5615 firms)
Notes: 
1) See footnotes of Table 5. The GMM estimates reproted are one-step results in all equations. R&D performers are defined as firms reporting non-
zero R&D expenditures and non-performers reporting no R&D expenditures within observation periods.
2)  * Variables are treated as endogenous.Table 8ɹTFP Growth Rate Differentials Generated by Differences in Competition
 News paper industries -52.8%  Furniture & fixtures 2.7%
 Drugs & medicines -46.8%  Electric equipment & computers 3.0%
 Publishing industries -44.5%  Wooden containers & wood 3.3%
 Toilet preparations & others -25.3%  Plastic products 3.5%
 Beverages & tobacco -23.5%  Flour & grain mill products 3.9%
 Medical instruments -21.6%  Rubber & plastic footwear 4.0%
 Miscellaneous food products -15.4%  Pulp & paper mills  4.2%
 Oil products & detergents -13.1%  Electrical industrial machinery 5.6%
 Industrial inorganic chemicals -12.2%  Textile outer garments 5.8%
 Measuring & analytical instruments -9.2%  Household electric appliances 7.6%
 Tires & inner tubes -8.9%  Communication equipment 8.1%
 Printing -6.3%  Prepared feed & fertilizers 8.4%
 Clay, pottery & stone products -4.6%  Fabricated structural metal 8.6%
 Petroleum & coal products -3.6%  Electronic parts & devices 8.6%
 Seafood products -1.7%  Optical instruments & lenses 8.8%
 Industrial organic chemicals -1.2%  Non-ferrous rolling & casting 9.7%
 Cement & cement products -0.5%  Iron & steel 11.9%
 Miscellaneous metal work 0.2%  Ordnance & accessories 12.1%
 Paper products 0.4%  Leather products & fur skins 12.1%
 Chemical fibers 0.9%  Watches, clocks & related parts 12.2%
 Miscellaneous electric equipment 1.1%  Woven & knitted fabrics 12.6%
 Office & household machines 1.3%  Miscellaneous transport equipment 12.7%
 Apparel 1.4%  Non-ferrous metals 12.9%
 Livestock products 1.5%  Motor vehicles & parts 12.9%
 Glass & glass products 1.6%  Dyed &finished textiles 13.1%
 General industrial machinery 1.8%  Sawmills & millwork 13.5%
 Special industry machinery 1.8%  Blast furnace & basic steel 16.6%
 Other textile mill products 2.1%  Reeling plants & spinning mills 23.1%
 Metal working machinery 2.2%  Petroleum refining 23.3%
Note: These differentials are calculated from the unweighted mean.it
it
Table 9
Production function: GMM estimates (large and small firms)
  Dependent variable: ∆output it
Large firms (emp>300) Small  firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
* ∆output it-1   -0.023   -0.017   -0.036   -0.052
  (0.011, p= 0.033)   (0.010, p= 0.091)   (0.010, p= 0.000)   (0.008, p= 0.000)
* ∆emp it   0.312   0.270   0.545   0.440
  (0.106, p= 0.003)   (0.101, p= 0.007)   (0.083, p= 0.000)   (0.055, p= 0.000)
* ∆capital it   0.711   0.747   0.491   0.612
   ∆industrial_sales jt   0.067   0.071   0.048   0.073
  (0.029, p= 0.021)   (0.028, p= 0.011)   (0.017, p= 0.005)   (0.024, p= 0.003)
   ∆import_penetration jt   0.002   0.003   0.011   0.008
  (0.009, p= 0.805)   (0.008, p= 0.686)   (0.004, p= 0.007)   (0.005, p= 0.139)
* ∆share it   -0.024   -0.035
  (0.023, p= 0.306)   (0.018, p= 0.050)
*  ∆pcm it   -0.049   0.013
  (0.030, p= 0.105)   (0.018, p= 0.445)
    comp jt   2.291   2.143   2.304   2.410
  (0.468, p= 0.000)   (0.488, p= 0.000)   (0.355, p= 0.000)   (0.448, p= 0.000)
    rd_herf jt   -0.222   -0.196   -0.326   -0.227
  (0.089, p= 0.013)   (0.088, p= 0.026)   (0.054, p= 0.000)   (0.064, p= 0.000)
*   diversity it   0.090   0.085   0.052   0.048
  (0.037, p= 0.015)   (0.037, p= 0.022)   (0.026, p= 0.047)   (0.031, p= 0.114)
*   debt_asset   -0.963   -0.662   -0.815   -1.250
  (0.251, p= 0.000)   (0.266, p= 0.013)   (0.362, p= 0.024)   (0.324, p= 0.000)
*   tech_trade   1.319   -0.603   2.737   2.237
  (2.798, p= 0.637)   (2.822, p= 0.831)   (0.808, p= 0.001)   (1.253, p= 0.074)
*   size it   -9.47e-06   -6.55e-06   -9.72e-04   4.86e-04
  (1.27e-05, p=0.455)   (1.26e-05, p=0.604)   (3.06e-04, p=0.001)   (4.32e-04, p=0.261)
    m1   -17.98  (p = 0.000)   -17.60  (p = 0.000)   -17.26  (p = 0.000)   -24.84   (p = 0.000)
    m2    -2.20  (p = 0.028) 
̈    -1.54 (p = 0.123)    -1.15  (p = 0.251)    0.57 (p = 0.570)
    Sargan
  χ
2(98) = 77.77   χ
2(98) = 60.73   χ




  (p = 0.935)   (p = 0.999)   (p = 0.0004)   (p = 0.774)
    Observation   6947 (2704 firms)   6929 (2723 firms)   17724 (7222 firms)   12250 (5615 firms)
Notes: 
1) See footnoteof Table 5. GMM estimates reproted are one-step results in all equations. Small firms are defined by the number
of permanent employees which is no more than 300.
2)   * Variables are treated as endogenous.
3) † indicates that serial correlation test from the one-step homoskedastic estimator in column (1) cannot reject the null of no
second-order autocorrelation. This may imply that the estimates are inconsistent.
4) †† indicates that Sargan test rejects the null that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. However, this could be due to
heteroskedasticity. Therefore we reported robust estimates and serial correlation tests in column (3).